The Future of Transatlantic Relations and NATO

Hard bargaining between two close friends over their nation’s interests is the very foundation of a transatlantic relationship, according to Dr. Kori Schake. This dynamic defines the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which was founded after the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949. With U.S. actions creating tensions between NATO and its allies, key questions emerge about alliance stability and U.S. national security: Can NATO remain effective if the United States is no longer seen as a reliable leader? And how might the weakening of trust across NATO allies ultimately impact American national security interests?

Dr. Schake is a leading expert in U.S. foreign and defense policy who spoke at the Skyline Country Club on April 2 as part of the 2025–2026 TCFR season. She is a senior fellow and director of foreign and defense policy studies at the American Enterprise Institute and has held senior roles at the U.S. State Department, the Department of Defense, and the National Security Council, as well as serving as deputy director-general of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London. She has also advised the 2008 McCain campaign and taught at universities including Stanford, West Point, Johns Hopkins, and the University of Maryland.

Hard Bargaining and the Historical Foundations of NATO

Author and transatlantic relations expert Stan Sloan stated in 1983 that the three oldest refrains in the West are “NATO is in crisis; deterrence is breaking down; and we need new thinking.” This provided a framework for Dr. Schake’s analysis of today’s NATO and its foundation as an alliance. In 1941, the U.S. committed to Britain’s success, with the Atlantic Charter setting the stage for principles that would “eventually destroy Britain as an empire”: the end of preferential trading with the British in favor of free trade, and the principle of self-determination for peoples. Former president Franklin Roosevelt demanded a bargain for a “hint” that the United States might support Britain's war effort; the story of NATO comes by hard bargaining between friends, according to Dr. Schake. 

In 1954, NATO’s first military commander Dwight Eisenhower threatened European allies with an “agonizing reappraisal” of the U.S. commitment to Europe under President Harry Truman, despite originally viewing U.S. troop deployment there as a temporary postwar measure. Before Congress, he testified troops would remain for a short time — long enough for European countries to rebuild economies and fund defenses. However, as president, Eisenhower pushed European allies to support West Germany’s rehabilitation, prioritizing the growing Soviet threat over remaining fears even as European allies resisted. Eisenhower warned that the U.S. might cut ties and withdraw from Europe if they refused to support the rehabilitation, which Dr. Schake argued reflects the nature of the transatlantic relationship; Europe's willingness to accept a German state creation and restoration of its military shortly after World War II if the U.S. remained visibly committed to their defense. This is central to NATO — whether the alliance can operate alone, or if it depends on U.S. leadership and power. In this context Dr. Schake framed two key questions to understand NATO tensions: Can the allies cooperate if the United States is not there to set policy agendas and run the organization, and who would lead the military alliance if it were not the U.S.? 

Keeping the U.S. In, the Russians Out, and Germany Down

NATO’s first Secretary General famously said that the purpose of NATO was to keep the United States in, the Russians out, and the Germans down. While it succeeded in two of these, as Dr. Schake explained, it did not attempt to succeed at the third; to keep Germany down. What NATO instead attempted to create was a broad enough circle of cooperation that a strong Germany would not be a threat to the rest of Europe, which Dr. Schake highlighted NATO "succeeded magnificently" in this. 

An area to remember about NATO historically is the worry of burden sharing since its inception. It is often thought that Europeans do not do enough, while Europeans argue the U.S. proposes ideas for self-benefit but place greater burdens on Europe. Dr. Schake gave examples of such beliefs. Firstly, the NATO treaty was signed in 1949 without a military component, which only came after North Korea invaded South Korea in 1950. It’s been argued since who should be doing more and in 1952, NATO devised its first “big plan” for sharing military responsibilities: Lisbon Force Goals. The Soviet threat was clear, as was the alliance’s inability to meet military targets — Britain was “still rationing food in 1954” Dr. Schake pointed out — causing tension as Europe pushed the U.S. to do more while the U.S. expected greater European contributions. The Eisenhower administration turned to tactical nuclear weapons as a solution; a strategy popular in the U.S. but unpopular in countries where the weapons would be used. But to keep Russians out and Americans in, the NATO allies agreed to disagree, Dr. Schake explained. “That is the secret genius of an alliance among countries that are genuine friends, because we want to find a way to make this work.” By balancing competing interests with different strategies, and deterrence with diplomacy, this flexibility has proven effective — over 75 years, no one has been brave enough to invade a NATO country. 

What Makes Today’s NATO Frictions Different?

NATO frictions are not new. Such examples can be found in nuclear arguments with France in the late 1950-60s, or France’s withdrawal from the integrated military command and ordering all foreign troops out. What is different about current frictions in NATO is those that President Donald Trump has set in motion. It is not news that Americans believe Europeans underinvest in their own defenses, Dr. Schake underscored, or that Europeans have been uneasy about U.S. behavior, concerned that American actions could pull them into conflicts they do not want a part in. “What is new and different in the Trump administration is that the president seems genuinely not to value the fundamental bargain.” 

Trump considers allies to be a net loss rather than a net gain — an aspect Dr. Schake noted as “shocking,” given the deep military and economic integration between the U.S. and its allies; it is nearly impossible to meet today’s globalized threats without allied cooperation. Even current frustrations, such as U.S. concerns over maintaining open seas like the Strait of Hormuz, place emphasis on U.S. dependency to do so when its own capacity is stretched thin. 

Eroding Trust in U.S. Alliances and Security Consequences

Dr. Schake broke down Trump’s current agenda into three main points; Canada, Greenland, and threats to withdraw from NATO. Firstly, if the U.S were under a nuclear attack, the initial warning would come from the United States Northern Command, coordinating with the North American Aerospace Defense Command in a U.S.-Canada defense system. This partnership is not a gift to Canada, but rather provides the U.S. with strategic depth to detect and respond to threats. The integration makes Trump’s humor claiming Canada as the “51st state” a risk that erodes trust with a vital ally and makes it harder for Canada’s cooperation in areas where the U.S. depends on its support, ultimately damaging American national security.

A second concern for NATO is Trump’s threats towards Greenland. The territory, governed by Denmark, has long provided strategic depth for the U.S.; since 1951 the U.S. has been granted unlimited military access and autonomy in Greenland. In Dr. Schake’s perspective, threatening to take such territory by force is damaging as Denmark is a democracy and ally. Conflict between democracies is rare — one exception was the “Cod Wars” in the 1950s-70s when Britain and Iceland fought over fishing rights, illustrating how unusual and destabilizing conflict between the two would be. In a broader sense, alliances like NATO depend on long-term cooperation rather than transactional thinking: “That's what President Trump fails to understand about the NATO alliance… it's not transactional,” Dr. Schake noted. Nations compromise because they expect future collaboration, and failing to recognize this weakens trust. Denmark’s prior support for the U.S. has collapsed; numerous Danish citizens consider the U.S. a threat, not an ally.

Lastly, the final point lies in Trump’s threat to withdraw from NATO. Congress has attempted to limit such power but the efforts have had little impact. In practice, presidential authority grows when Congress does not push back and has created tensions within NATO — the alliances are accustomed to a “reckless” U.S. and are buying time, trying not to escalate tensions. However, following Trump’s reelection, many allies have stopped distinguishing between presidential actions and the country itself. “They think this is who we are now, not who he is now,” Dr. Schake argued. There is still work to do, as tourists, business leaders, and citizens to remind the United States’ friends and allies that there is a diversity of opinion and authority in our country. The idea that the U.S. is stronger without allies is being tested in real time, and ultimately the absence of cooperation only increases the burden on the United States. “Things only get costlier and harder if you don't have friends helping you,” Dr. Schake stressed, and the structures of cooperation that the NATO alliance has given the U.S. has made us safe, and stronger.

Dr. Kori Schake, director of foreign and defense policy at the American Enterprise Institute, and U of A’s TCFR Student Fellow Dylann Sweeney at the Skyline Country Club on April 2, 2026.